QUOTE(Miss Betsy @ May 28 2009, 06:34 AM)

... but the point was that there is no pressure involved in blocking zombies who are not using servers. It stops spam from entering your network, but it doesn't put any pressure on the owners of those IP addresses to address the problem. Something else persuaded Comcast to do that. ...
Maybe, I'm not sure/convinced. The evidence, either way, is out there somewhere (botnet 'scoping' and other esoterica, though certainly indicative rather than absolute), all I have at this point is inference but pressing on with that ...
I had occasion (elsewhere) recently to look at a /16 CIDR range in SenderBase, owned by another provider. Now, using the same approach, Comcast is allocated the entire 76.96.0.0/11 - addresses in the 'block' 76.96.0.0 - 76.127.255.255 or 2,097,150 possible IP addresses. But SenderBase can only deal with /16 lookups - 65,536 addresses - at a time. Looking at a few /16 blocks within their allocation 'at random' - like 76.96.0.0/16 (76.96.0.1 - 76.96.255.255) shows IP addresses 'seen by SB' as 646 for that first /16 (~ 1%). Many addresses shown are mail servers on static assignment with neutral or (mostly) good SBRS (reputation scores). Just a few have no rDNS and/or the mysterious statistics of 0.0 daily magnitude and 0.41 (or 0.71 or 0.88) monthly magnitude. Subsequently, with some higher-number /16s, there are more IP address sightings (up to 3% of the range or ~ 2,000), dynamic assignments, more of the above 'mysterious' magnitude stats, more "Poor" SBRS ratings.
Comcast is also allocated 68.80.0.0/13 - 68.80.0.0 - 68.87.255.255. The story there is much the same - for the first half of the range. Apparently dynamic assignment, 2-4% of the range 'seen' by SB, raddled with the mysterious magnitude figures (0.0 & 0.41, etc.), poor SBRS, a scattering of DNSBL listings. There is the occasional daily magnitude, seldom above 2.3 (~ 4,000 messages). The second half of the /13 has very few records (not in use yet?)
Now, if there were a smart botnet or two, sending out up to 4,000 messages from a single machine/IP within a daily period then going dormant for a month or two (staggered with thousands of others doing the same, spread by design over the whole period of the cycle) that would be a 'snowshoe' operation which would be difficult to counteract (except by blocking dynamic sources), detect or eliminate. And that would be one interpretation of the figures. I don't really know enough about the SB operation/methods/results to know with any degree of assurance (for instance what, exactly, is the 'monthly' magnitude figure? - I've assumed it is the average daily magnitude for the previous month but it could be any of a number of quite different things). There's a limit to the amount of unremunerated research to which I am prepared/allowed to apply my haphazard and largely inadequate skills

.
By the way, that 'other' case. A user with another provider was investigating the reasons for being threatened with account closure by that provider. He had the equivalent of about a /21 (+2,000 IP addresses) though address ranges unknown - or even whether all within the one /16 not quite disclosed. There are a number of interesting aspects to this, one of which being the 'mysterious' daily magnitudes for the /16 investigated was very much in evidence, with about 4% of available addresses showing up on the SB lookup (though by no means all of them with the same magnitudes discussed here). But anyway, maybe it really is the 'background hum' of something like a snowshoe botnet. Or maybe a totally different phenomenon. Some peer-to-peer backwash? I don't know enough. Another point being neither the user nor the ISP appears the least bit concerned about any botnet possibility that it might indicate (though maybe it's just none/few of the implicated addresses was/were involved).
A completely different matter of interest is that the closure is not threatened for actual spamming as such but due to (possible) 'scanner-like' activity when incoming responses to probes (made to TCP port 37153) were detected by ACMA (Fed authority), apparently initiated from within the implicated address space. OK, participation in
The Australian Internet Security Initiative (AISI) is 'voluntary' (without knowing cost-benefit detail, inducements etc., associated with it) but hard to see anything similar gaining much traction in the land of the free. Or Brazil. Still, one must admit it is, indeed, an initiative. That other discussion at
http://forums.whirlpool.net.au/forum-replies.cfm?t=1208490 if of interest. Not well handled, not yet resolved, but early days still, I guess. The sun-bronzed ANZACs as ever forging ahead in the race to create the all-enveloping 'nanny state'. Canadians are about to lose their lead

.